Kamis, Juli 30, 2009
Anzac successor
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Label: Frigate
Iran's Anti-Ship Missiles
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Label: Iran's Anti-Ship Missiles
Rabu, Juli 29, 2009
Offer Russian Lada Class Submarine
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Label: Submarine
Mini submarine
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Label: Submarine
Minggu, Juli 26, 2009
Command Of The Sea
A naval force has command of the sea when it is so strong that its rivals cannot attack it directly. Also called sea control, this dominance may apply to its surrounding waters (i.e., the littoral) or may extend far into the oceans, meaning the country has a blue-water navy. It is the naval equivalent of air superiority.
Few navies can operate as blue-water navies, but "many States are converting green-water navies to blue-water navies and this will increase military use of foreign Exclusive Economic Zones [littoral zone to 200 nautical miles (370 km)] with possible repercussions for the EEZ regime.
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Label: command of the sea
Indonesian warship
SIGMA word is short for Integrated Ship Modularity Geometric Approach. This means that the integrated ship design with geometric modular approach and there are three variants of SIGMA corvettes 6910.8313, and 9113. After passing the old tug finally selected TNI AL 9113 variant. Simple consideration the physical size of the larger and longer range weapons would be carried more. Operational capability is expected to be a better and certainly a deterrent (deterrent) more calculated his opponent.
Stealth technology is required because this technology is required by modern warships and stealth technology is used in SIGMA class and stealth technology that rules are met then the diagonal structures in the design SIGMA corvettes made as little as possible. With this new sista alut Indonesian waters can be very wide awake sovereignty of the necessity of KRI always ready to guard the waters of Indonesia.
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CVN - 77 Operations
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Label: aircraft carrier
Sabtu, Juli 25, 2009
Guerrilla
Guerrilla (also called a partisan) is a term borrowed from Spanish (from "guerra" meaning war) used to describe small combat groups. Guerrilla warfare operates with small, mobile and flexible combat groups called cells, without a front line. Guerrilla warfare is one of the oldest forms of asymmetric warfare. Primary contributors to modern theories of guerrilla war include Mao Zedong and Che Guevara. While "asymmetric warfare" is the military term for guerrilla tactics, it is often referred to in the pejorative as " terrorism."
1 Etymology
The term was invented in Spain to describe the tactics used to resist the French regime instituted by Napoleon Bonaparte (one should however remember, that the tactics themselves were known and used even centuries earlier). The Spanish word means "little war". The Spanish word for guerrilla fighter is guerrillero. The change of usage from the tactics to the person implementing them is a late 19th century mistake. In most languages the word still denotes the style of warfare. However this is changing under the influence of the English usage.
Guerrilla tactics are based on ambush and sabotage, and their ultimate objective is usually to destabilize an authority through long, low-intensity confrontation. It can be quite successful against an unpopular foreign regime: a guerrilla army may increase the cost of maintaining an occupation or a colonial presence above what the foreign power may wish to bear.
Guerrillas in wars against foreign powers do not principally direct their attacks at civilians, as they desire to obtain as much support as possible from the population as part of their tactics. Civilians are primarily attacked or assassinated as punishment for collaboration. Often such an attack will be officially sanctioned by guerrilla command or tribunal. An exception is in civil wars, where both guerrilla groups and organized armies have been known to commit atrocitiesAn atrocity (from the Latin atrox "atrocious", from Latin ater "matt black" (as distinct from niger "shiny black")) is a reprehensible act ranging from an act committed against a single person but, usually, to one committed against a population or ethnic against the civilian population.
Guerrillas are often characterised as terrorists by their opponents. Guerrillas are in danger of not being recognized as combatantsA combatant (also referred to as an enemy combatant is a soldier or guerrilla member who is waging war. Under the Geneva Conventions, persons waging war must have the following four characteristics to be protected by the laws of war: In uniform Wear disti because they may not wear a uniformThis page describes uniform in the sense of clothing. For other meanings, see uniform (disambiguation . A uniform is a set of standard clothing worn by members of an organisation whilst participating in that organisation's activity. People performing reli, (to mingle with the local population), or their uniform and distinctive emblems my not be recognised as such by their opponents. Article 44, sections 3 and 4 of the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva ConventionsThe Geneva Conventions consist of treaties formulated in Geneva, Switzerland that set the standards for international law for humanitarian concerns. The conventions were the results of efforts by Henri Dunant, who was motivated by the horrors of war he wi, "relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts", does recognise combatants who, due to the nature of the conflict, do not wear uniforms as long as they carry their weapons openly during military operations. This gives non-uniformed guerrillas lawful combatant status against countries that have ratified this convention.
Guerrilla warfare is classified into two main categories: urban guerrilla warfare and rural guerrilla warfare. In both cases, guerrillas rely on a friendly population to provide supply and intelligence. Rural guerrillas prefer to operate in regions providing plenty of cover and concealment, especially heavily forested and mountainous areas. Urban guerrillas, rather than melting into the mountains and jungles, blend into the population and are dependent on a support base among the people. Foreign support in the form of soldiers, weapons, sanctuary, or, at the very least, statements of sympathy for the guerrillas can greatly increase the chances of victory for an insurgency, although it is not always necessary.
Maoist theory of people's war divides warfare into three phases. In the first phase, the guerrillas gain the support of the population through attacks on the machinery of government and the distribution of propagandaNorth Korean propaganda showing a soldier destroying the Capitol building. This article is about the type of communication. For other meanings, see Propaganda (disambiguation). Propaganda is a specific type of message presentation, aimed at serving an age. In the second phase, escalating attacks are made on the government's militaryMilitary (from latin militarius miles "soldier") as an adjective describes anything related to soldiers and warfare. Used as a noun, it is equivalent to Armed force. See also Armed force Martial art Militaria Military history Military rule Military by cou and vital institutions. In the third phase, conventional fighting is used to seize cities, overthrow the government and take control of the country.
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South Pacific Strategy
The U.S. Navy shifts its emphasis to cooperating with other nations. Will China be among them?
Bottom of Form
Admiral Timothy J. Keating, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, says it would be a "giant leap of faith" to believe the United States and China could develop a close military partnership any time soon. Keating, who commands U.S. forces responsible for an area ranging from New Zealand to Mongolia, says there will need to be more transparency, better understanding of Chinese intentions, and greater cooperation before the two sides could move toward a partnership. But Keating says the U.S. military in the Pacific continues to forge close relations with allies based on policies of mutual interest. Keating says the incoming Obama administration should "emphasize partnership, presence, and a military readiness" with allies while "acknowledging the environmental crises that are looming, to include global warming, to include energy demand."
The new U.S. Pacific Command strategy you approved in November has been described as a subtle shift in vision, in which America's assertive role in the region is deemphasized in favor of greater cooperation and collaboration. Elaborate on why you think this change was necessary now.
It is, I think, from our position, as much as an acknowledgment of the way of the world as recognition of the main elements of the strategy and their importance. We are working as hard as we know how to emphasize partnership, not just [military-to-military], not even just interagency to interagency, but government to government, non-government organizations to NGOs, commercial partners to commercial partners. It's a fairly broad coalition, if you will, of not just the willing, but 'the coalition, the committed,' as the Tongans put it. So, there is an increase in awareness of, an emphasis on partnership, and an acknowledgment, not just from our bully pulpit, but enforced by all the conversations that I have in the twenty-eight-some countries we visited so far, of the desire for U.S. presence. So, that's where you get a partnership, a presence and a military readiness. [It's] not so much a new way of thinking about things as wrapping what has proven to be successful over decades out here with an eye on the way ahead.
So it's not about a concern that U.S. image in the region needs an overhaul?
There is not in this headquarters and I get no sense of that in my discussions with military, governmental, and commercial partners all throughout the Asia-Pacific region. I don't get that sense.
The new strategy seems to suggest that all players in the region should be treated as partners, not threats, but with regards to China, I wonder if there is a slight contradiction between your strategy and the Pentagon's approach.
We don't see it that way. I think it's a giant leap of faith to think that in the near-to mid-term, we as a nation and the policy makers in particular would regard China as a partner, particularly, on a mil-to-mil basis. That said we hope that in the mid- to long-term we can be closer to that consideration than we are today. And to get from where we are--not a partner--to where we would like to be--more like a partner--is going to require more transparency, a better understanding of intention on our part of the Chinese, and to get there we would need more active cooperation with the Chinese.
A Chinese military official recently suggested China would be interested in acquiring an aircraft carrier. Staying with this question of intent, first, how far along is China in that acquisition process? Would China acquiring weaponry of this type be a significant strategic concern for the U.S., or is it more of a symbolic threat?
China already has an aircraft carrier. They bought a discarded, which may be the word, or excess military equipment, ski-jump carrier from Russia. It wouldn't take a whole lot for China's military to get their hands on that platform and perhaps do some research and development testing to figure out whether they could return it to aircraft carrier status. Now, all that said, it's a fairly rudimentary kind of carrier, it's a ski-jump, very small flight deck capability and it's old and the Russians gave it up for a reason I would assume. So to get to the larger issue of does China want to pursue the capabilities inherent in an aircraft carrier or a navy that has aircraft carrier capability? I believe they do. In discussions I had in our first visit to China over a year and a half ago, some senior Chinese official, he was a Navy guy at the two or three star level, said, "Hey you know, we're thinking of building carriers and how about we make you this deal," he said, I think in jest. He had a wry grin on his face but he nonetheless made the following statement: '"You keep your aircraft carriers east of Hawaii. We'll keep ours west. You share your information with us; we'll share our information with you. We'll save you the time and effort of coming all the way to the Western Pacific."
Did you take him up on it?
Well, my response was just as yours was. I chuckled, slightly, and said, no thanks. Then I went on to tell him: "it ain't as easy as it looks and it's taken us since before World War II to get our aircraft carrier technology and capability to where it is today." Russia and other countries have discovered, once again: "It ain't as easy as it looks." So we'll watch carefully if China chooses to pursue the development of aircraft carrier technology and capability. We will ask them to be transparent with us. We will ask them to share with us their intentions. But when we've done that in the past, the Chinese military and the government officials say in response to my questions, "Well you need to understand, we only want to protect those things that are ours." Fair enough, so do we, and so do all countries who have access to the maritime domain and the air domain.
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Label: strategy